South atlantic zone: a 40-year experiment in peace faces new tests
Forty years from now, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) will reach a significant milestone. But this anniversary isn’t just a celebration; it’s a moment to confront a decades-long experiment in regional stability that has weathered Cold War anxieties, shifting Brazilian priorities, and the persistent challenges of South-South cooperation.
A child of the cold war and falklands tensions
Born from United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/41/11 in 1986, ZOPACAS emerged from a complex geopolitical landscape. The recent, bloody conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) – pitting a NATO member against a signatory to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – underscored the fragility of peace in the South Atlantic. Adding to the unease was the specter of escalating tensions between the US and the Soviet Union spilling over into the region, recalling the devastating Angolan civil war of the 1970s and 80s, a proxy conflict fueled by Cuban and South African intervention.
The initiative also served as a direct response to South Africa's apartheid regime attempting to cultivate support among South American dictatorships, potentially leading to the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). Brazil, actively distancing itself from the apartheid government at the time, recognized ZOPACAS as a strategic opportunity to counter this maneuver.

Beyond peace: cooperation and shifting priorities
ZOPACAS wasn't conceived merely as a demilitarized zone. The inclusion of “cooperation” aimed to foster concrete South-South initiatives—sharing expertise in areas like maritime resource protection and international law. The early years aligned with a broader trend of strengthening technical cooperation, particularly following the 1978 Buenos Aires Action Plan. However, the Zone’s trajectory hasn't been a linear one. Periods of intense engagement, particularly during the Lula and Rousseff administrations (2003-2016), saw Brazil re-prioritize Africa and the Global South, evidenced by the reopening of embassies and defense cooperation agreements. Conversely, the 1990s witnessed embassy closures, reflecting a shift in focus toward Asia and South American integration.
Current challenges and a renewed push
Despite its longevity, ZOPACAS faces persistent hurdles. A diverse membership, while lending legitimacy, also results in uneven commitment levels. Brazilian diplomats have frequently encountered a lack of awareness regarding the Zone among their African counterparts. The breadth of topics—ranging from academic exchange to maritime security—strains the institutional capacity of some member states to effectively participate. Logistical challenges—the distance, the cost of transatlantic travel, and the need for multilingual translation (English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish)—have contributed to significant gaps between ministerial meetings.
The recent meeting in Mindelo, Cabo Verde, in April 2023, after a decade-long hiatus, signaled a renewed commitment, spearheaded by President Lula’s return to power. Brazil has consistently shouldered a disproportionate share of the Zone’s operational costs, mobilizing aircraft to transport delegations and providing translation services. This has heightened expectations regarding Brazil's continued leadership.
The road ahead: rio de janeiro and beyond
The upcoming ministerial meeting in Rio de Janeiro in April 2026 is a pivotal moment. Discussions will center on establishing a more institutionalized structure, potentially including a ZOPACAS Defense College. Beyond ZOPACAS, Brazil’s engagement with Africa is being reinforced through initiatives like the Africa-South America Summit and the High-Level Forum between CELAC and Africa, recognizing Latin America and the Caribbean as the African Union’s sixth region.
ZOPACAS has demonstrated remarkable resilience, surviving the end of the Cold War and navigating the complexities of a multipolar world. Yet, its future hinges on Brazil’s ability to adapt to a more competitive landscape, where both Northern and Southern powers vie for influence in Africa. The Zone’s commitment to denuclearization and maritime environmental protection remains vital, but Brazil must now mobilize domestic resources and foster concrete cooperative efforts to ensure ZOPACAS remains a relevant and effective diplomatic asset. The test, ultimately, isn’t just about maintaining peace, but about building lasting partnerships in a rapidly evolving world.